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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action by the plaintiff for injuries sustained arising out of an automobile accident on or about
March 17, 1971, northwest of Green River, Utah on U. S.
Highways 50 & 6. Defendant denied liability on the basis
of unavoidable accident or plaintiffs contributory negligence.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Case was tried to a jury. From a verdict and
judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, the defendant appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks for reversal of the judgment granted
in the lower court by reason of the lower court's inadvertence, or mistake, or failure to give the defendant's
requested instructions relative to defendant's theory of
the case, namely the trial court failed to give the requested instructions relative to an unavoidable accident
and J.I.F.U. Instruction 2.5., which defined what acts
of the plaintiff constituted contributory negligence,
while giving as Instruction No. 5, what acts of the defendant constituted negligence. Defendant asserts that
this failure gave the Jury an undue emphasis on Plaintiff's theory of the case and no real assistance in applying defendant's theory.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
That on or about March 27,1971, the plaintiff and defendant were traveling in separate cars from West to
East on U. S. Highways 50 and 6. The weather was
clear but windy. The roads were dry. At a point approximately 5 miles northwest of Green River, Utah, both
1
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parties encountered wind storms carrying dust and
debris. These wind storms were blowing in the same
general direction the plaintiff and defendant w e r e
traveling, although somewhat across the road. The plaintiff proceeded through a small dust storm, then into a
large dust storm at which time she immediately sloweH
her vehicle speed to five miles per hour. The defendant
was a sufficient distance behind the plaintiff's vehicle
as to be unaware of its presence on the road and had not
seen plaintiff's vehicle prior to plaintiff's entry into a second dust storm. The posted highway speed was 70 miles
per hour, and the defendant had been traveling between
65 and 70 miles per hour. Defendant entered the first
dust storm and as quickly as he cleared the same, he
became aware that another storm was in front of him.
The distance between the two storms was only a matter
of a few hundred feet. The defendant began to decelerate, turned on special lights and entered the storm.
Immediately, he saw the brake lights of the plaintiff's
vehicle and applied his own brakes. The distance was
not sufficient for him to come to a stop and avoid the
accident. At approximately 11:45 a.m. defendant's vehicle collided with the plaintiff's vehicle, propelling the
plaintiff's vehicle forward into a third vehicle. The
plaintiff's vehicle caught on fire. The plaintiff's husband,
a passenger, was killed in the accident. The plaintiff
was apparently unconscious and the defendant dragged
the plaintiff from her burning vehicle. The plaintiff
claims to be free of any contributory negligence. The
defendant claims that he had no opportunity to prevent
the accident having had insufficient notice of the plaintiff's presence in order to bring his vehicle to a stop
prior to the accident, or that the plaintiff failed to give
the defendant sufficient notice of the presence of the
plaintiff's vehicle so as to avoid the accident.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT, BY FAILING TO GIVE
THE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS, FAILED TO PRESENT TO THE JURY, IN A
C L E A R AND UNDERSTANDING MANNER, THE
PRINCIPLES OF LAW APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE.
The Jury, as the trier of the fact, was instructed by
the court as to what the law was. As laymen, the jury
relies heavily upon the court's instructions in order to
know how to proceed. While there were relatively few
material differences in the testimony as to how the accident occurred, there is a great difference of opinion as
to how the facts should be interpreted. For this court
to understand defendant's theory of the case and defendant's grievance by reason of the lower court's failure
to give the requested instructions, it is necessary to
detail the factual situation involved.
There were three drivers of vehicles, a passenger
^nd a highway patrolman who testified as to the accident
during the trial.
The first driver was Mr. Bates of the Utah Fish and
Game Department. He was traveling from Woodside
to Green River for lunch. The other two drivers were
the plaintiff and defendant. All three drivers agreed
that prior to the dust storm, it had been dry and clear
(Transcript, p. 39, line 23; p. 90, lines 9 - 1 1 ; p. 303, lines
4 - 8 ) . Mr. Bates testified that he had passed the plaintiff's vehicle immediately prior to entering the dust
storm (Ibid., p. 38, lines 28 - 30; p. 48, lines 5-16). This
was the first dust storm that Bates had seen on the day
in question. Bates testified that even up to one-half mile
prior to the second storm he was traveling approximately
65 miles per hour (Ibid., p. 48, lines 9-16). Upon entering the dust storm, the passenger in the Bates vehicle,
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Stevens, testified that Bates almost collided with the
rear end of another vehicle (Ibid., p. 53, lines 21 - 28)
because of the intensity of the storm. Bates testified
that he could barely see the tail lights in front of him
(Ibid., p. 40, line 6; p. 46, lines 24 - 28) and that he "could
crawl along on the highway" (Ibid., p. 46, line 17). Bates
and his passenger were both also aware of the fact that
another vehicle was behind them since they had just
passed it, so Bates continued to watch for it in his rear
view mirror (Ibid., p. 39, line 28; p. 53, lines 14 -15).
The second driver was the plaintiff. Prior to the
accident the plaintiff had been traveling approximately
55-60 miles an hour (Ibid., p. 278, lines 14 - 15) when she
was passed by the Fish and Game vehicle. She testified
that she had gone through one dust storm which passed
quickly and could then see a second dust storm (Ibid.,
p. 92, lines 12 - 17). The plaintiff reluctantly admitted
that when she entered the second dust storm, she felt
that it would also pass quickly (Ibid., p. 279, lines 14 - 29).
Nevertheless, because of the density of the storm, she
slowed her speed to approximately five miles per hour.
Because the Fish and Game vehicle had passed her, she
knew of the presence of that vehicle and obviously was
on guard for the same. The plaintiff, Mrs. Stringham,
testified that she "could not see ahead of me, only just
the hood of my car." (Ibid., p. 279, line 18). She was in
the storm approximately five minutes, moving 5 miles
per hour, when the accident occurred (Ibid-., p. 93, lines
6 and 21; p. 280, lines 21 - 22). The defendant stated that
she slowed her speed to five miles an hour "because I
didn't know how far ahead of me this other car was"
(Ibid., p. 93, lines 6 and 7).
The defendant was the third driver. While we do
not know how far the defendant was behind the other
two vehicles, we know that he was traveling between
65 and 70 miles per hour, and it was approximately 5
minutes after the plaintiff entered the second storm,
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that the accident occurred. Thus it would seem that
the defendant was approximately 4 to 5 miles west of
the plaintiff when she entered t h e second dust storm.
The defendant had passed through a small dust storm
(Ibid., p. 304, lines 8 - 1 3 ) , when he observed the second
storm, which was about 100 yards east of the first storm.
The defendant decelerated at that point and entered the
second storm. At the count of 1, 2, 3, the defendant observed the brake lights of the plaintiff (Ibid., p. 304,
lines 20 - 22). The defendant immediately applied his
brakes (Ibid., p. 304, lines 26 - 27) but was unable to
avoid the accident. The defendant had neither prior
warning nor knowledge of the presence of either the vehicle driven by Bates or the plaintiff's vehicle prior to
entering the second storm. The highway patrolman investigating the accident testified that the storm extended
into Green River (which was at least five miles east of
t h e accident, and perhaps beyond, but was unable to
identify how far east or west the storm extended (Ibid.,
p. 19, lines 28 - 30; p. 20, lines 5 - 7.) However, all of
the drivers testified that the storm did not extend very
far west of the scene of the accident.
This court has recognized that there are cases where
the facts warrant giving an instruction on unavoidable
accidents. (See Porter v. Price, 11 Utah 2d 80, 355 P. 2d
66, 68; and Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 P. 2d
701.) In the Wellman case the court noted that in most
eases such an instruction is superfulous. However, due
to the fact situation involved in this appeal, the defendant urges this court to concur with a statement made by
the trial judge before he inadvertently omitted giving
defendant's requested instruction relative to unavoidable
accidents and J.I.F.U. Instruction 2.5. At that time, the
trial judge said, "I think that I shall give an instruction
on contributory negligence and also on unavoidable
accident and let them mull both of those over" (Op. Cit.,
p. 332, lines 29 & 30; p. 333, line 1). However, due to
some confusion at the time the court gave its instruc5
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tions, both of those instructions were overlooked, which
oversight was acknowledged by the trial court to counsel, and request was made by the trial court to give
that instruction to the jury after the oversight was ascertained. However, plaintiff's counsel strongly resisted
that suggestion, so the error was not corrected. The
confusion referred to is as follows: The trial court originally reserved two days for the trial of the matter. In
compliance with that understanding, the defendant subpoenaed a witness by the name of Helen Hurst to be
and appear at 2:00 p.m. on Thursday, February 14, 1974,
which was the second day of the trial, to testify for and
in behalf of the defendant. However, the testimony of
the medical experts took longer than was anticipated
and expected so the trial was not completed on the
second day, and the defendant was unable to call Mrs.
Hurst at the time she was subpoenaed. Mrs. Hurst was
scheduled to be at a wedding at Manti on the morning
of Friday, February 15, 1974, and by leave of the court,
she was allowed to go to Manti for the wedding ceremony. It was anticipated by defendant's counsel that
the witness would be available for testimony at 2:00 p.m.
on Friday, February 15, 1974. However, the witness did
not appear at the appointed time, and after short delay
the defendant was required to rest his case. The trial
judge then proceeded to give the jury instructions (Ibid.,
pgs. 335 & 336). Prior to the conclusion of the instructions,
the defendant's witness, Mrs. Hurst, appeared to testify.
The defendant requested, and, over the objection of the
plaintiff, leave was granted by the court for the defendant to reopen his case and allow Mrs. Hurst to testify
(Ibid., pgs. 336 - 338). Although it does not appear in
the transcript of the trial, thereafter, the court noted
its own error in failing to give the instructions requested
by the defendant relative to his theory, namely J.I.F.U.
Instruction 2.5., and the instruction relative to unavoidable accident, namely, J.I.F.U. Instruction 16.1. Defendant's counsel requested the court to give the instructions
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to the J u r y at that time (which was prior to the argument of counsel). The plaintiff's counsel insisted that
for the trial court to do so would be to give too much
emphasis to defendant's theory of the case and would
be reversible error. Based upon the arguments of the
plaintiff, the trial judge did not give the defendant's
requested instructions and directed both counsel to
argue their theories to the jury based only on the instructions that had previously been given the J u r y as to the
law in the matter.
f" Defendant asserts and woi ilci urge this Court to
find that this particular fact stituation is one in which
the trial court should have given the requested instruction relative to unavoidable accident. The facts show
defendant had no warning of the presence of the plaintiff's vehicle until he was on it. The paintiff's brake
lights were on, indicating she was stopping on the roadway. Even the plaintiff could not see past her hood. The
dust was rolling in. While the plaintiff was aware of
and knew of vehicles in front of her the defendant had
no such knowledge. As regretable as the accident was,
there was nothing a reasonable and prudent man could
have done to avoid the accident. The non-party driver,
Bates, did not slow his vehicle below 65 miles per hour
until he was nearly in the storm, which indicates that he
was not apprehensive until he was in the storm. The defendant started decelerating as he approached the storm,
but found himself on to the plaintiff's vehicle too soon
to stop. The defendant's conduct was not a great deal
different from that of Bates, except he found plaintiff's
vehicle nearly stopped in front of him, with brake lights
glowing. If the plaintiff was in the storm for five minutes, t r a i l i n g five miles per hour, she traveled approximately '**H9 feet from the west edge of the second storm,
into the storm. The defendant, during that same period,
traveled at least four and probably closer to five miles
through the small storm and then into the s e c o n d
storm. The plaintiff and defendant both felt that the
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second storm would pass quickly. Neither party expected
the storm to be as dense as it was. The plaintiff practically came to a stop, and the defendant, not knowing of
the presence of the plaintiff's vehicle, accidentally collided with that vehicle. If ever a fact situtation would
justify a jury instruction regarding an unavoidable accident, it would seem that this case would be the perfect
one.
-•":
Not withstanding appellant's urging this Court to
find that the trial court should have given the instruction relative to a unavoidable accident, if this court
should find against your appellant regarding the same,
appellant would urge that a new trial should be ordered
for failure to give requested J.I.F.U. Instruction 2.5.
Defendant asserts that the trial court, by giving the
plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 5, relative to the
duty of the defendant to the plaintiff and thus what
constituted negligence, and by failing to give the defendant's requested J.I.F.U. Instruction 2.5., relative to
the duty of the plaintiff to the defendant and thus
defining what actually constitutes contributory negligence, was and is reversible error. Your appellant asserts,
that without the requested instruction the jury was unable to accurately and correctly ascertain and apply
the law in question. Subsequent to the jury verdict, as
the parties were leaving the court house, the defendant's
counsel was approached by six members of the jury who
informed him that the only reason they had reached a
verdict in favor the plaintiff and against the defendant
was that when Instruction No. 5 was read in the jury
room, which instruction clearly defined the defendant's
duty to the plaintiff, and when the jury could find no
instruction which defined the plaintiff's duties to the
defendant, the jury felt it had no alternative but to find
in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, even
though the six jurors felt the accident could not be
avoided. By reason of those representations, defendant's
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counsel subsequently prepared identical affidavits to
that effect for the jurors, which were duly executed by
five of the jurors and submitted to the trial court, together with a motion for a new trial, which motion was
subsequently denied. Those affidavits were requested
to be transmitted to this Court as a part of the record.
Appellant draws this court's attention to said affidavits
for the purpose of demonstrating that the instructions
given the jury were not correctly presented in that the
instructions were neither clear nor understandable to
the jury and thus caused the jury to misapply the same.
Appellant thus asserts that the trial court's failure to
give the requested instructions at the time requested
was and is reversible error which caused the jury to be
unable to correctly apply the law in a clear and underatandable manner.

POINT II
THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO THE SAME
BENEFIT OF PROPER JURY INSTRUCTION AS WAS
AFFORDED TO THE PLAINTIFF. FAILURE TO GIVE
SAID INSTRUCTION IS REVERSIBLE ERROR.
It is the settled rule of this court that each party is
entitled to have its theory of the case presented to the
jury so long as the facts are sufficient to substantiate
the same. The defendant acknowledges that the trial
court gave general instructions relative to negligence
and contributory negligence. However, the trial court
explicitly defined what acts of the defendant would
constitute negligence on the part of the defendant in
Instruction No. 5, but neglected to give at the request of
the defendant J.I.F.U. Instruction 2.5., which would
have set forth with particularity the duties of the plaintiff to the defendant and thus the acts of the plaintiff
which would have constituted contributory negligence.
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A case which appears to be close in its facts to the
instant case is that of Flippen v. Mil ward (120 Utah 373,
234 P. 2d 1053 (1953)) where the defendant's automobile
rear-ended the plaintiff's automobile in a dense fog. The
Court in affirming a verdict for the defendant stated
that the instructions regarding plaintiff's duty to use a
stop light signal were proper. By the same reasoning it
would seem that the trial court's failure to give defendants requested instruction regarding the plaintiff's duty
to the defendant would be improper, and therefore reversible.
Defendant accepts the well established rule of law
that the jury instructions must be considered in their
entirety along with all other instructions (See Simpson
v. General Motors Corp., 470 P. 2d 399, 24 Utah 2d 301
(1970)). Also Enell and Son, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp.,
493, P. 2d 1283, 27 Utah 2d 188, (1972)). However, in
considering all of the instructions together, the defendant asserts that undue emphasis was given to the plainiff's theory of the case and that equal emphasis was not
given to the defentant's theory of the case, which fact
caused the jury to be confused and to inappropriately
apply the law in question as is witnessed by their swQrn
affidavits.

SUMMARY
Defendant contends that a new trial should be
ordered by this court directing that the trial court shall
give jury instructions consistent with the defendant's
theory of the case and that are harmonious with the
facts. Undue emphasis should not be given to either the
plaintiff's or defendant's theories, but the instructions
should be fair, clear and understandable, so that the jury
can correctly apply the law to the facts as they shall
find them.
10
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